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Repairing and re-using from an exclusive rights perspective – towards sustainable lifespan as 
part of a new normal? 
Taina Pihlajarinne 
1. Introduction 
Many environmental problems are associated with increased consumption of products, 
especially those with a short lifespan. From a sustainability standpoint, repairing and utilising 
recycled products as material for new products results in energy savings and reduction of waste, 
and should therefore be promoted.1  Technological advances, such as 3D printing, might create 
new possibilities for repairing activities.2 However, right holders frequently have business 
strategies that create incentives for invoking patent or trademark rights to restrict recycling that 
they deem unwelcome. Problems might emerge in secondary markets as well as in markets for 
products beyond those offered by intellectual property owners. 
Since mass products are often delivered over vast geographical areas, the only realistic way to 
promote their circulation is to open markets for repair services and other recycling activities. 
There are several problems in this context. For instance, patenting tools and methods for re-
utilisation of materials might be problematic in this respect. Exclusive rights targeted at spare 
parts might restrict offering them.3 In addition, for instance, a secondary market actor might 
need to use another´s trademark to indicate compatibility with the main product or the fact that 
it provides a repair service targeting products originating from a trademark holder.4 Some of 
                                                          
1 On those impacts in detail, see B Liu ‘Towards a Patent Exhaustion Regime for Sustainable Development’, 32 
Berkeley J Int’l L (2014) 330, 336‒337. In addition to environmental impact, repair activities may promote 
general knowledge of technology in developing countries and thus social sustainability. Liu 2014, 334‒335. 
2 If a 3D printer can use material suitable for making a spare part, it is possible to print perfect copies of spare 
parts by 3D printers. In that case, the problem of making or repairing in patent law might become even more 
relevant if 3D printers become the mainstream technique used by households. See, eg, M Norrgård, RM 
Ballardini and MM Kasi ‘Intellectual Property Rights in the Era of 3D Printing’ in (eds) RM Ballardini, M 
Norrgård, J Partanen: 3D Printing, Intellectual Property and Innovation. Kluwer Law International 2017, 63, 
69. 
3 For instance, in a Norwegian case Court of Appeal’s decision Apple v. Huseby 21.06.2019 the Court of Appeal 
concluded that it was a trademark infringement to import mobile screens intended to be used as spare parts. The 
spare parts contained Apple´s logos, but the logos were covered by ink. The appeal is pending in the Supreme 
Court of Norway. The essential questions in the case seems to relate to the assessment of whether this kind of 
use is considered to be detrimental to the origin function or investment function of a trademark. In this context,  
one important issue is how permanently the removal of a trademark has been made and how feasible it is to 
assume that the trademark would be visibly used later. 
4 The Trademark Directive (Art 14 1c) provides a limitation for using a trademark to indicate the intended 
purpose of goods or services. See, eg, CJEU case The Gillette Company, Gillette Group Finland Oy v LA-
Laboratories Ltd Oy C-228/03. Even though this situation falls beyond the scope of this Chapter, the interests 
are to some extent similar: it is a question of access to spare parts markets connected to the circular economy on 
   
 
   
 
the problems relating to spare parts can be addressed by using competition law mechanisms.5 
In addition, end-user licence agreements (EULAs) can be used by IPR holders in software 
industries to restrain repair activities by non-authorized repairers, and the legal status of 
EULAs remains unclear.6  
This Chapter examines utilisation of recycled materials from European patent and trademark 
law perspectives. Due to the wide scope of the theme, the assessment is not comprehensive. 
Instead, it focuses on two examples demonstrating a strong property right impact on recycling 
efforts. The first is the consideration of normal lifespan in the repair or reconstruction 
dichotomy in the patent context, and the second a possibility to utilise trademarks in so called 
upcycling7 activities.  The chapter assesses the structures and interpretations of exclusive rights 
conferred by patent law and trademark law as impediments for the circular 
economy in achieving its full potential in terms of repairing products or re-using materials. 
When considering repairing activities and how IPRs might impede them, the doctrine of 
exhaustion is the most essential.8 While contractual mechanisms, such as EULAs, might also 
have significant importance for possibilities as to repairing activities, they fall beyond the scope 
of this Chapter. 
A fundamental structural problem is that a repair business must resort to exceptions and 
limitations, such as the doctrine of exhaustion. Instead of integrating sustainability only to 
exceptions and limitations, revisiting exclusive rights themselves might be needed to 
incorporate sustainability comprehensively in IPRs.  
2. Circular economy, sustainability and IPRs 
The concept of ‘sustainable development’ originates from the Report of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development (WCED) of 1987, where it was defined as ‘development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’. Since then, the concept has been widely used.9   
Sustainability is usually defined through interconnected pillars that include environmental, 
economic and social issues. These pillars represent a wide range of issues, for instance the 
environmental pillar refers to protection of environmental resources for present and future 
generations.10 Environmental sustainability is also defined as the social foundation for 
                                                          
the one hand, and trademark holders’ interest in preventing confusion of origin and free-riding on the signs’ 
goodwill on the other hand. 
5 Refusal to supply spare parts can, in certain situations, be considered as abuse of a dominant position. See, eg, 
Judgment of the General Court in CEAHR v. European Commission, T-712/14. Additional sector-specific 
mechanisms concerning supply of spare parts include, eg, the Automotive Block Exemption Regulation (EU) 
No 461/2010.  
6 On EULAs as impediments for repair activities both from the European and US perspectives, see S Svensson, L 
Richter, E Maitre-Ekern, T Pihlajarinne, M Aline and C Dalhammar, ‘The Emerging “Right to Repair” legislation 
in the EU and the U.S.’, Conference paper for the Going Green - Care Innovation 2018.   
7 On definition of upcycling, see p. X. 
8 Previous research supports this assumption: eg, Liu concludes that ‘the current exhaustion doctrine, when applied 
to the refurbishing industry, fails to balance its mandate of promoting technological progress with the broader 
program of sustainable development and is therefore unsuitable for countries on the modernization path’. Liu 
2014, 332. 
9  In the WCED, it was also stated that sustainable development is ‘the process of change in which the exploitation 
of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development and institutional change 
are all in harmony’. See D McGoldrick ‘Sustainable development and human rights: an integrated conception’, 
ICLQ 1996, 45(4), 796, 796.  
10 E Rodrigues, The General Exception Clauses of the TRIPS Agreement. Promoting Sustainable Development. 
CUP 2012, 1‒2. 
   
 
   
 
humanity within ‘planetary boundaries’.11 Two of them ‒ climate change and biosphere 
integrity ‒ could be described as being core planetary boundaries which the circular economy 
might have great potential to affect. Moreover, a division has recently arisen between ‘weak’ 
and ‘strong’ sustainability. Weak sustainability brings environmental concerns into existing 
business structures and systems, while strong sustainability aims at integrating business into 
environmental systems by challenging existing structures so that industrial activities would fit 
within the capacity of the planet.12 
Sustainability as a policy or legal principle13 has connections to fundamental rights and human 
rights. Although direct mentions of sustainability or environmental issues in international 
human rights instruments are relatively infrequent, there has been a gradual development where 
sustainability has gained a position in human rights discussion and the issue of a ‘human right 
to the environment’ has been discussed.14  
A provision on sustainable development appears in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). According to Article 3(3) TFEU, the EU shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe, which specifically includes a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment. Article 11 of the TFEU states that 
environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development. The Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 37) includes a similar 
provision: ‘A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the 
environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with 
the principle of sustainable development.’ This provision requires promotion of environmental 
protection in EU policies. In addition, EU law should be interpreted by taking into 
consideration the environmental objectives of the TFEU 11 beyond issues that are directly 
environmental.15 Hence, the environmental integration obligation is not only one of the oldest 
integration clauses in EU law, but also holds enormous potential as a means of steering the 
interpretation and application of EU legal instruments that – in one way or the other – affect 
the environment. This objective must be balanced with protection of property and intellectual 
                                                          
11 See, eg, J Rockström, ‘Planetary Boundaries: exploring the safe operating space for humanity’, Ecology and 
Society 14/2009, and B Sjåfjell, J Mähönen, A Johnston, J Cullen: Obstacles to Sustainable Global Business. 
Towards EU Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development. SMART Project, 2018, 16-18 (On file with the 
authors). 
12 N Roome, ‘Looking Back, Thinking Forward: Distinguishing Between Weak and Strong Sustainability’. The 
Oxford Handbook of Business and the Natural Environment 2012 (Online book)  
13 See C Voigt, ‘Article 11 TFEU in the light of the principle of sustainable development in international law’, in 
B Sjåfjell, A Wiesbrock (eds): The Greening of European Business under EU law. Taking Article 11 TFEU 
Seriously. Routledge 2014.  
14 Eg, the Rio Declaration (1992) states that human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development and they have a right to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature. That standpoint was 
affirmed in the Johannesburg Declaration in 2002. See more J Glazebrook, ‘Human rights and the Environment’ 
40 (2009) Vict U Wellington L Rev 293, 294‒298. Some countries, such as Switzerland, have explicitly 
incorporated the concept of environmental sustainable development into their constitutions. See MD Khalid, F 
Jalil and BM Mazlin, ‘Environmental Sustainability as a Human Right’, in V Mauerhofer (ed): Legal Aspects of 
Sustainable Development. Horizontal and Sectorial Policy Issues. Springer 2016, 79, 83‒84, However, several 
issues in this regard have raised discussion. These include the individualistic nature of the human rights-based 
approach, which does not correspond well with the value of the environment; the uneasiness of defining the 
qualitative level of environment that could be guaranteed by the human rights approach and the possibility to 
impose obligations on individuals. See McGoldrick (n 8), 811‒812. 
15 B Sjåfjell, A Wiesbrock‘The importance of Article 11 TFEU for regulating business in the EU 
Securing the very basis of our existence.’ In B Sjåfjell and A Wiesbrock (eds): The Greening of European Business 
under EU law. Taking Article 11 TFEU Seriously. Routledge 2014 (Online book). 
   
 
   
 
property protection referred in TFEU Articles 36 and 118. In intellectual property issues, the 
CJEU should balance between the objectives of IPR protection and Article 11.16 On the other 
hand, Member States have a duty of loyalty (TFEU Article 4.3), which means they must follow 
the principle of sustainable development when applying EU law.17 
Even though sustainability must be promoted whenever possible, nevertheless both in 
formulation and application of EU intellectual property regulation, the relationship between 
IPRs and environmental sustainability is not straightforward. There are several cross points, of 
which for instance the role of IPRs in development, deployment and access to green technology 
innovations,18 and the relationship between the circular economy and IPRs, are amongst the 
most relevant.  
The circular economy is a term that describes a new industrial model that aims to reduce waste 
and optimize the use of resources. As opposed to a linear model of consumption ‘take, make, 
waste’ the aim is to ‘reuse, repair, recycle, functional economy, eco-design, industrial ecology, 
sustainable supply and responsible consumption’.19 The transition to the circular economy has 
been described as entailing four fundamental building blocks: 1) materials and product design 
2) new business models 3) global reverse networks and 4) enabling conditions. It depends, 
however, on decisions by policymakers and on business entities introducing circularity into 
their business models.20 At the same time, short-term oriented legal systems often support 
linear models of consumption, which are not necessarily in line with the requirements of the 
circular economy.21 
The current structures of IPR systems mainly reflect a need for weighing and balancing 
between the aims of exclusive rights and general arguments on free competition and efficient 
markets but not sustainability. However, sustainability interests are often intertwined with 
competitive issues of the recycling industry, since competition arguments also cover 
competition by sustainable business models. From a broader perspective, the aim of intellectual 
property rights is ‒ by encouraging innovations, creative work and reducing search costs ‒ to 
foster scientific, technical and social progress, that is to say, sustainable welfare.22  
                                                          
16 Sjåflell uses Concordia Bus Finland C-513/99 as an example of cases where the court has, in a traditionally 
economic area, stressed the objective of environmental protection by referring to the environmental integration 
rule. B Sjåflell, ‘The legal significance of article 11 TFEU for EU institutions and Member States’. In B Sjåfjell 
and A Wiesbrock (eds): The Greening of European Business under EU law. Taking Article 11 TFEU Seriously. 
Routledge 2014 (Online book). 
17 B Sjåflell ‘The legal significance of article 11 TFEU for EU institutions and Member States’. In B Sjåfjell - A 
Wiesbrock (eds): The Greening of European Business under EU law. Taking Article 11 TFEU Seriously. 
Routledge 2014 (Online book). 
18 See, eg, M Rimmer, Intellectual Property and Climate Change: Inventing Clean Technologies, EE (2011) and 
A Brown, Environmental Technologies, Intellectual Property and Climate Change. EE 2013. On the interplay 
between climate change and IPRs, see also J Sarnoff (ed) Research handbook on Intellectual Property and Climate 
Change. EE 2016. 
19 D Gaullard and L Blandine: Circular Economy, Industrial Ecology and Short Supply Chain: Towards 
Sustainable Territories. John Wiley & Sons 2016, 1, 3‒4.  
20 M Lewandowski, ‘Designing the Business Models for Circular Economy—Towards the Conceptual 
Framework’ 2016) Sustainability, 8 (2016), available at http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/8/1/43, 1.  
21 J Mähönen ‘Financing Sustainable Market Actors in Circular Economy’. October 26, 2018. University of 
Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper No 2018-28. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3273263, 1, 1.  
22 On the patents perspective, G van Overwalle: ‘Smart Innovation and inclusive patents for sustainable food and 
health care: Redefining the Europe 2020 objectives’. In Geiger, Christopher: Constructing European Intellectual 
Property. Achievements and new Perspectives. EE 231‒254, 250.  
   
 
   
 
Due to the stated objective, in some singular cases fine-tuning the system might be enough. 
From a strong sustainability perspective, a more fundamental change is needed to direct 
incentives in a way that fosters sustainability. A strong property-rights approach to intellectual 
property can create incentives for original manufacturers but it fails in terms of creating 
incentives for sustainable business models.  Environmental arguments should, however, have 
a standalone position instead of having only indirect, implicit relevance through arguments 
relating to competition. In the case of having only implicit relevance, it might be difficult for 
sustainability arguments to override traditional strong utilitarian justifications for IPRs.23  
Incorporating sustainability in terms of exceptions and limitations is not sufficient as such. 
From a perspective of implementing strong sustainability into IPR regulation, sustainability 
cannot have a role only in levels of exceptions and limitations, that is to say, as an exception 
to the main rule of IPRs as strong property rights. This is because ‒ due to a strong property 
rights perspective having often been followed in Europe ‒ new exceptions and limitations are 
difficult to implement, while existing ones are in many traditions interpreted narrowly. 
Conceiving sustainability as only an exception to strong property rights as a main rule, that is 
to say, seeing sustainability as a negative variable, does not enable the ambitious goals of a 
‘strong’ sustainability approach. A balance between sustainability and IPRs as property-related 
arguments requires sustainability to be embedded into IPR regulation as a general principle.  
 
2. Two examples of the negative effects of a strong property right approach on the circular 
economy 
 
2.1 Repairing activities and patents – the outdated idea of ‘normal’ lifespan? 
 
The rights conferred by patent are wide and these provisions do not usually provide much 
flexibility.24 Therefore, repair business’ activities targeted at patented products are easily 
considered as prima facie infringements and exhaustion as limitation turns out to be of utmost 
importance. The basic idea under the doctrine of exhaustion is that, once sold, a product can be 
used and repaired within its normal lifespan. After the first sale or, to be more precise, first 
marketing, the patent has fulfilled its purpose and the patentee received compensation.  
In Europe, Josef Kohler developed the theory of exhaustion at the end of the 19th century. In 
his theory, the doctrine of exhaustion was developed out of the implied licence construction, 
since Kohler discussed firstly the implied licence doctrine and after that, expanded his view 
into a general doctrine of exhaustion which could be applied outside of the contractual 
                                                          
23 However, the ultimate problem – even if sustainability were fully recognized by the IPR system ‒ is the 
priority of legitimate interests.  As Voigt (n 12) points out, if other interests are considered as having importance 
enough, interests relating to environmental protection ‘can simply be “balanced away”’.  
24 Patent infringements in European countries are of two types: direct and indirect, eg, such acts as making, 
using, selling and importing a patented invention without permission are direct infringements. Indirect 
infringement refers typically to secondary liability on the basis of supplying means that relate to an essential 
element of a patented product to a person with the knowledge that such means will be used in an infringing 
product. See more detail, RM Ballardini, M Norrgård and T Minssen, ‘Enforcing Patents in the Era of 3D 
Printing’. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Vol 10, Issue 11, 1 November 2015, 850, 852‒862. 
Eg, Arts 25 and 26 of the Unified Patent Court Convention include detailed and broadly formulated provisions 
on direct and indirect use of patent as infringements.  
   
 
   
 
relationship.25 A purchaser is allowed to use a product within its ‘intended use’, and repair 
within the ‘normal lifespan of products’ is also possible. 26 
The scope of exhaustion is not, however, internationally harmonised but left to the discretion 
of national courts instead (for instance, TRIPS Article 6). The fact that exhaustion might be 
national, regional and international might create barriers for repair activities.27 Interpretations 
of what kind of activities constitute making a new product might differ between jurisdictions; 
additionally, a lack of clear rules results in lack of uniformity inside jurisdictions. Moreover, 
some of these practices might stand in fundamental contradiction with the modern circular 
economy. 
The principle of exhaustion is closely linked to single market policies, since a broad 
interpretation of exhaustion is supported by the free movement of goods. The CJEU has stated 
that patent law must be compatible with those policies.28  The Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents (EPO) allows an applicant to acquire a bundle of national patents by a single 
application, but the Convention does not include much harmonisation. Article 29 of the 
Agreement of the Unified Patent Court (UPC-agreement) includes a provision on exhaustion.29 
The big picture regarding exhaustion will not be changed: once products have been put in 
markets anywhere in the internal markets, they can subsequently be sold everywhere in the 
internal markets. It is possible that the details of exhaustion will be harmonized in the practice 
of the Unified Patent Court. However, this is only a partial solution due to the fact that 
defendants might still face claims for infringement of national patents.  
From the circular economy perspective, the most essential feature in the exhaustion doctrine is 
drawing a line between repair and reconstruction. While repairing a patented product is 
permissible, construction of a new product is not. Claims of both direct and indirect 
infringements can be assessed under the exhaustion doctrine.30 An impermissible 
reconstruction might constitute a direct patent infringement. In addition, sale of an unpatented 
replacement part can be counted as indirect infringement, as facilitating direct patent 
infringement.  
                                                          
25 See G Westkamp, ‘Exhaustion and the internet as a distribution channel: the relationship between intellectual 
property and European Law in search of clarification’, in I Calboli and E Lee (eds): Research Handbook on 
Intellectual Property Exhaustion and Parallel Imports. EE, 498‒499 referring to J Kohler: Deutches Patentrecht 
1878, 157‒161.  
26 J Kohler, Handbuch des deutschen Patentrechts, available at http://dlib-
pr.mpier.mpg.de/m/kleioc/0010/exec/books/%22161848%22, Mannheim 1900, 452‒456. 
27 The EU applies regional exhaustion to sales in the European Economic Area.  The USA applied national 
exhaustion before US Supreme Court decision 30.6.2017 Impression Products Inc. v. Lexmark International 
according to which foreign sales also exhaust US-based patent rights, meaning that the doctrine of international 
exhaustion applies. Japan and China apply international exhaustion as well.  
28 In Merck & Co. Inc. v Stephar BV and Petrus Stephanus Exler.C-187/80 the CJEU stressed that the 
‘substance of a patent right lies essentially in according the inventor an exclusive right of first placing the 
product on the market.’ After that, the right is exhausted. The CJEU has stated that Art 36 TJEU allows 
exceptions to the free movement of goods only to the extent to which such exceptions are necessary for the 
purpose of safeguarding rights that constitute the specific subject-matter of the type of intellectual property in 
question.  SA CNL-SUCAL NV v HAG GF AG. C-10/89. Therefore, first marketing can be seen as a specific 
subject matter. See S Enchelmaier, ‘A Competition Law Perspective I: Competition Law Aspects of European 
Patents with Unitary Effect’, in (eds) J Pila, and C Wadlow, The Unitary EU Patent System. Hart 2017, 111, 
114‒115.  
29 According to the article, there is an exhaustion of the patent after the product has been placed on the market in 
the EU by the patent holder, unless there are “legitimate grounds for the patent proprietor to oppose further 
commercialisation of the product”.’ 
30 On direct and indirect infringements, see n 24. 
   
 
   
 
The limits between repair and reconstruction are not clear. For instance, in the UK exhaustion 
is partially based on an implied licence construction.31 Exhaustion provision can be found in 
UK law only to the extent that it is required due to the EC Treaty. Under domestic law, the 
concept of an implied licence is still to some extent decisive.32 A principal weakness from the 
sustainability standpoint lies in setting the recycling business dependent on the right holder’s 
declaration of will-type acts, which might strengthen the right holder’s possibilities to set 
conditions on subsequent utilisation of a product. In Schutz v. Werit 20.3.2013 the Supreme 
Court concluded that the division between repair and reconstruction depends on various 
factors, for instance the life expectancy of the part and whether the part embodies the 
inventive concept of the patent.  
  
In Germany, there is a tradition of stressing the ‘essential element of invention’ and ‘inventive 
function’.33  The Supreme Court has applied a test according to which the line between repair 
and reconstruction is drawn by assessing whether the components are such that their 
replacement can usually be expected during the working life of the device, that is to say, how 
the product’s lifespan is seen in the trade. If replacement of a component can be expected, then 
replacement is not per se infringement, but then it must be assessed whether the technical effect 
of the invention is reflected in replaced components. If the answer is affirmative, then the use 
constitutes reconstruction and counts as a patent infringement (BGH: Palettenbehälter II and 
“Trommeleinheit”). As a comparison, in the USA, the main principle is that unpatented 
consumable parts are free to be replaced, while in Germany a broad interpretation of indirect 
infringement is applied – a wide interpretation of an essential element of an invention might 
impede secondary market actors.34  
                                                          
31 The situation is similar in USA. Eg, Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd.  (Fed Cir 2003) illustrates well the 
position of the implied licence doctrine in connection with repair activities. See more about the case, Rovner, 
Amber Hatfield: ‘Practical Guide to Application of (or Defense Against) Product-Based Infringement 
Immunities Under the Doctrines of Patent Exhaustion and Implied License’ 12 Tex Intell Prop LJ 227 (2004), 
248‒249. 
32 Eg, in an early decision, Solar Thomson Engineering Co. Ltd. and Another v Barton, High Court of Justice, 
Civ Div, 17 March 1977, the court stressed that there was an implied licence to repair a patented product, but 
not for making new products. Eg, in United Wire v Screen Repair Services (Scotland) 2000 concerned screens 
for filtering machines used in oil exploration. There were patents relating to filter meshes and their frames. The 
defendant supplied new meshes at the correct tension. The Court of Appeal stated that genuine repair did not 
infringe the patent. However, although a patentee exhausted his patent rights on sale, allowing the owner to 
make repairs, this did not mean that the owner also had an implied licence to make a product. The court 
concluded that there was a patent infringement. 
33 Eg, the German Reich Supreme Court, 4 October 1938, Case No. I 233/37, Gerbsäure, German Reich 
Supreme Court; Federal Supreme Court, 12 June 1951, Case No. I ZR, Tauchpumpensatz, Federal Supreme 
Court, 10 December 1981, Case No. X ZR 70/80, Rigg. In the German Reich Supreme Court, 25 October 1924, 
Case No. I 521/23, 1926 GRUR 163 – Schraubstöpselsicherung, the court stated that the replaced part, a 
‘cartridge’, was an important part of the invention and embodied the inventive function. About these cases, see 
M Mohri, “Patents, repair and recycling from a comparative perspective” IIC 2010, 41(7), 779, 791‒792. 
34 See Federal Supreme Court 4 May 2004 - Case No. X ZR 48/03, Flügelradzähler. The case concerned a flow 
meter comprising housing and removable measuring capsules. The measuring capsule was intended to be replaced 
during the lifespan of the product. The plaintiff sold flow meters and replaceable measuring capsules. The housing 
part was the ‘novel’ part. The defendant sold measuring capsules. The court concluded that this was an indirect 
patent infringement of the Patent Act Section 10 since they were ‘means relating to an essential element of the 
invention’. The court stated that means relates to an essential element of the invention if it is capable of 
cooperating functionally with that element in the implementation of the protected inventive concept. The 
defendant's measuring capsules were designed in accordance with a feature of the patented product and were 
suitable and intended to interact with the housing. Replacement of the part during the expected working life of a 
machine did not constitute a new making of the product. However, if that part embodies essential elements of the 
invention, the patent holder has not already drawn the technical or commercial benefits as a result of the first 
putting into circulation of the device as a whole. The case has been criticized as favouring patent holders, since 
   
 
   
 
The first problem is that unpredictability due to lack of harmonisation both in international and 
European level as such is a risk for recycling activities. Secondly, the threshold of ‘normal’ 
lifespan, that a product can be used and repaired within the normal lifespan of a product 
involves problems. Assessment should be made on the basis of whether the product has fulfilled 
its function: is life at an end? The normal lifespan of a product has been assessed on the basis 
of ‘common understanding in society’,35 but not without criticism. The concept of a normal 
lifespan under a common understanding in society can lead to imbalanced results since the way 
the public perceive a product’s lifespan very much depends on the patent holder’s guidance. In 
addition, a normal lifespan does not necessarily reflect the core interests that are aimed to be 
protected by IPRs. To illustrate, a sold product as the public perceive it does not necessarily 
correspond to the invention. For instance, both single-use or durable products can be based on 
the same invention.  
The patent holder’s way of marketing and presenting a product has an impact on how the public 
perceive its lifespan.36 Potentially, a patent holder can choose to create or to not create an 
assumption that a product’s normal lifespan includes changes of replacement parts by, for 
instance, selling replacement parts separately. Additionally, it is relevant what kind of implicit 
or explicit information they give on the lifespan of the product; for instance on its utilisation 
value or exchange value. From the sustainability viewpoint, right holders’ possible tendency 
to see a product’s lifespan as shorter than it could potentially be, might be problematic.    
                                                          
every element of the patent claim could be an ‘essential’ element of the invention. Mohri 2010, 788‒789. 
Additionally, in the Düsseldorf High Court case, 17 November 2005, Kaffee-Filterpads, a patent on a coffee 
machine consisted of a filter holder and filter pads. The court concluded that selling filter pads that were 
compatible with the machine was an indirect infringement, since the coffee pads were compatible with the filter 
holder, both of which performed an inventive function. The means of putting a new coffee pad into the machine 
was described in the patent specification. The court stated that the patentee had not yet capitalized on its invention 
by selling coffee machines that have such a combination and therefore replacing the pad was considered as a 
reconstruction of the patented invention.  In the USA, the approach has instead been open for replacements. In 
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) and Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) the patent holder owned a patent on a convertible top. The defendant sold 
fabric components that replaced portions of worn-out fabric which required replacement after three years of use. 
The court stated that the combination patent covered the totality of the elements in the claim, and there was no 
legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a combination patent. 
The court stated that a purchaser cannot reconstruct or make a totally new patented product after a product sold 
as a whole has become spent, but ‘mere replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of the 
same parts repeatedly or different parts successively, is no more than the lawful right of the owner to repair his 
property’. 
35 The reasoning adopted by the German Supreme Court in BGH, 17 July 2012, X ZR 97/11 (Palettenbehälter 
II) offers a good example of such argumentation. The patent covered a pallet container, consisting of an inner 
container, flat pallets and bars of metal in the shape of a basket. The defendant sold and exchanged the inner 
containers in containers originally sold by the plaintiff. The court stated that in drawing the line between repair 
and reconstruction, it is important to assess whether the technical effect of the patented invention resides in the 
part exchanged. However, if consumers and trade circles believe that a replacement constitutes a remanufacture 
of the patented product, the action constitutes a patent infringement, in spite of the estimation of whether the 
replacement reflects the technical aspects of the innovation. Therefore, consumers’ view on the perception of the 
product ‒ the assumptions of its use value as well as exchange value ‒ are relevant. However, the meaning of 
repair in common language and in the IPR context can sometimes be remarkably different. For instance, as 
stated in United Fire: ‘repair’ refers to remedial actions that might not involve replacement of parts or involve 
extensive replacement of parts. The latter might infringe the patentee's rights while the former does not.  
36 C Heath and M Mori, “Ending is better than mending - recent Japanese case law on repair, refill and 
recycling” International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 37(7) 2006, 856 863. In addition, 
Heath and Mori suggest that the concept of the normal lifespan is too vague and thus creates legal uncertainty as 
to the markets for repair.  
   
 
   
 
A third problem is that in general, traditional property right perspectives seem to guide the 
courts towards having a tendency to follow old traditions rather than open their argumentation 
for sustainability. It seems that the courts are not inclined to use arguments relating to 
sustainability in their interpretations of repair and reconstruction.37 A traditional, property-
rights attitude for courts is highly problematic in Europe from the perspective of Article 11 
TFEU.  
2.2 Upcycling: trademarks as right holder’s property, badge of origin or an indicator on 
recycling?  
From the perspective of re-utilisation of trademarked products, trademarks might serve several 
purposes. In some cases, a trademark is affixed to a product that is re-used and it is impossible 
or difficult or expensive to remove – if a trademark right prohibits its presence on the product, 
it constitutes a direct obstacle for recycling. A trademark as a sign might be irrelevant as such.  
Secondly, a secondary market actor might have an interest in using a trademark in a product or 
in its package as an indication of the origin of raw material.38 From several potential situations, 
the example of so called ‘upcycling’ (or ‘trashion’) cases is used here to demonstrate problems 
of a strong property rights approach from the trademark perspective. The concept of upcycling 
is used to describe creation of objects, such as bags or jewellery, objects used as home-
decorative purposes from used products.39 In these cases, beyond the markets of trademarked 
products, a trademark might be a key feature of a product for the consumer. With regard to a 
product used as raw material and a new product, the product categories and the functionality 
of products are, surprisingly, completely different. This is an element that makes it attractive 
for consumers. In these cases, a trademark serves as an indication of recycling. However, this 
kind of (new) function of trademarks is a reflection of the origin function of the product utilised 
as raw material. When a trademark has changed as a badge of recycling, the risk of confusion 
might be low despite the fact that the trademark might form a prominent feature of the 
product.40  
In general, trademark law has on the one hand been demonstrated as being rather flexible when 
facing challenges such as digitalisation. This is due to flexible building blocks such as the 
                                                          
37 Similarly from perspective of USA and Japan. MS Hashiguchi, ‘Recycling Efforts and Patent Rights Protection 
in the United States and Japan’ 33 Colum J Envtl L (2008), 169, 180‒185.  
38 Trademark Directive 14 1b limitation could be applied to such situations since when a trademark’s purpose is 
to indicate the origin of raw material, it directly tells something about the goods offered, and it can be permitted 
if it is in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. In Germany, the right to use a 
trademark indicating the origin of raw material has traditionally been assessed by paying special attention to the 
degree of alteration of the original product. See G Riehle, ‘Trade Mark Rights and Remanufacturing in the 
European Community. With Special Emphasis on the Rebuilding of Automotive Parts’. Max Planck Institute 
for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Munich 2003, 91‒92. In the case Bundegerichtshof GRUR 
1998, 687 Venus Multi, the German Supreme Court stated that it is irrelevant in these situations whether a raw-
material’s trademark has been left untouched on to the new product or re-affixed there.  
39 See, eg, A Anderson, ‘Trash or Treasure? Controlling your brand in the age of upcycling’ In Trademark 
129/2009, Issue 129 1,1.  
40 However, right holders might be suspicious of their trademark being utilised, eg, see Anderson 2009 (n 38), 
1‒2 who argues the importance of reacting to this kind of use, eg, stating that in the case of a bag constructed 
only from cookie wrappers originating from a single trademark holder, the prominent nature of the trademark 
would lead a reasonable consumer to assume that the bag was produced by the trademark holder or under its 
supervision. However, Anderson recognises that aggression towards this kind of trademark utilisation might 
also result in ill-will associated with the trademark holder as the trademark holder could be seen as having little 
concern about the environmental impact of its products.  
   
 
   
 
principle of confusion and the commercial use criterion.41 In upcycling cases, trademark 
infringements under Article 10 2 a (so called double identity rule) and b (confusing similarity 
-rule) are not probable since the goods are typically different from the ones for which trademark 
is registered.42 However, the requirements set by Article 10.2 c for protection of trade marks 
with a reputation could be fulfilled; among others, on the basis that the use means free-riding 
(use “takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character of repute” of trademark) or tarnishing 
the trademark’s reputation (use is “detrimental to repute” of trademark).43 
 
If trademark owners’ interests dominate in interpretation of Articles 10.2 a-c and upcycling is 
deemed as being a prima facie infringement, the next step is to consider the exceptions and 
limitations. Exhaustion of a trademark is harmonised in the EU. There is relatively little case 
law from the CJEU on exhaustion in the contexts of recycling and re-using materials. However, 
one possible interpretation is that the exhaustion doctrine might cover only repairing a product 
to its original condition. It might not be applied, instead, to a recycled product bearing an 
original product’s trademark in a case where, due to a stage of alteration, the identity of the 
product has turned into a new, independent product. In that case, the product is not the same as 
was originally put on the market, since arguably the essence of the exhaustion doctrine is to 
define the limits of a trademark right on a product originating from the trademark owner. If the 
identity of a product has essentially changed, the product originates from recycling businesses, 
not from the trademark owner. However, when it is applied, a trademark holder might 
additionally prevent further commercialisation of the product in the case of a ‘legitimate 
reason’ as meant in Article 15.2 of the Trademark Directive, “especially where the condition 
of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market”.44 Assessment of 
                                                          
41 See T Pihlajarinne ‘Non-traditional Trademark Infringement in the 3D Printing Context’, in (eds) RM 
Ballardini, M Norrgård and J Partanen: 3D Printing, Intellectual Property and Innovation. 303‒316, 305‒308. 
Kluwer International 2017.  
42 However, the so called double identity rule (Article 10.2 a) which requires both trademarks and goods to be 
identical could be applied in such exceptional cases where a trademark proprietor is registered the mark for the 
same goods that are produced by used materials. It is possible that that the requirements set by CJEU would be 
considered to be fulfilled - for instance, that use is detrimental for the investment function of trademark. The 
CJEU has stressed that only use that is detrimental to the functions of a trade mark, especially to the origin 
function, is an infringement under the double identity rule, eg, the following judgments of the ECJ: Arsenal 
Football Club plc v. Reed, C-206/01; Anheuser-Busch v. Budéjovicky Budvar, C-245/02; Adam Opel AG v. 
Autec Ag., C-48/05. Such a use is not, however, necessary, since the CJEU has stated that use that is detrimental 
to the investment function could also be infringing under this rule. See cases L´Oréal SA, Lancome parfums et 
beauté & Cie SNC and Laboratoire Garnier & Cie v. Bellure NV, Malaika Investments Ltd and Starion 
International Ltd, C-487/07 and Interflora Inc. Interflora British Unit v. Marks & Spencer et al. C-323/09. 
43 The CJEU has stated that free riding refers to use where user seeks “to ride on the coat-tails of the mark with a 
reputation in order to benefit from the power of attraction, the reputation and the prestige of that mark and to 
exploit, without paying any financial compensation, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of the mark 
in order to create and maintain the mark’s image”. The CJEU has defined tarnishing as use which reduces the 
trade mark’s power of attraction. In particular the characteristic or quality of the goods might have negative 
impact on the image of the mark. L´Oréal SA, Lancome parfums et beauté & Cie SNC and Laboratoire Garnier 
& Cie v. Bellure NV, Malaika Investments Ltd and Starion International Ltd, C-487/07.  
44 This problematic was considered by the CJEU in Viking Gas A/S v. Kosan Gas A/S. The plaintiff sold so called 
composite bottles with carbon dioxide, as the holder of an exclusive licence of three-dimensional trademarks (the 
shape of bottles and containers for liquid fuels). A consumer purchased a bottle from plaintiff, paying for the gas 
as well as for the bottle. After this sale, a buyer could exchange the bottle for a new one filled by plaintiff, paying 
only for the gas. The defendant offered a possibility for consumers to exchange an existing composite bottle in 
return for a full one, affixing its name and logo thereto, adding information on gas filling stations. The name of 
the plaintiff was also visible. The CJEU pointed out that composite bottles to be re-used a number of times are 
not mere packaging of the original product but have an independent economic value and must be considered as 
goods. A balance must be found between the legitimate interests relating to a licensee profiting from the 
trademarks and the legitimate interests of purchasers of those bottles, in particular the interest in fully enjoying 
   
 
   
 
whether there is substantial material alteration does not necessarily reflect the legitimate 
interest of trademark protection. In many upcycling cases there certainly is substantial material 
alteration but no risk of confusion or damaging the reputation of trademark.  
In EU trademark law, the general idea of whether use harms trademark functions such as an 
original function or an investment function, is at the core of finding infringements and therefore 
is likely to be reflected in the interpretation of exhaustion.45 The CJEU view in Copad SA v. 
Christian Dior couture SA and Others, C-59/08 indicates a rather extensive protection for 
brand owners from damaging the luxury image in connection with exhaustion. 
However, the Trademark Directive (Article 14 1b) limitation might also be applicable in cases 
where, due to a stage of alteration, the end product has turned into a new, independent 
product.46  In upcycling cases, one could argued that a the trademark serves as an indication of 
the characteristics of a good, that is to say, an indication of the origin of the raw material used. 
To be permitted, the use must be ‘in accordance with honest practice in industrial or 
commercial matters.’ However, the CJEU has guidelined in Adam Opel v. Autec AG, C-48/05 
and Adidas AG et al v. Marca Mode CV, C-102/07 that only such use that indicates the 
characteristics of the products of the third party utilising a trademark falls into the scope of the 
limitation. A trademark as an indication must directly relate to the characteristics of the goods 
                                                          
their property rights in those bottles, and the general interest in maintaining undistorted competition. The court 
concluded that the right holder could not prevent this without a proper reason for the purposes of Art 7(2) of Dir 
89/104. Therefore, the exhaustion doctrine was applicable, but with the restrictions set by Art 7.2 of the Trademark 
Directive. The use of the word ‘especially’ in Art 7(2) of the Directive indicates that alteration or impairment of 
the condition of goods bearing a mark is given only as an example of what may constitute legitimate reasons. A 
legitimate reason also exists when use by a third party of a sign identical with, or similar to, a trademark seriously 
damages the reputation of that mark or when that use is carried out in such a way as to give the impression that 
there is a commercial connection between the trademark proprietor and that third party, and in particular that the 
third party is affiliated to the proprietor’s distribution network or that there is a special relationship between those 
two persons. The labelling of the composite bottles and the circumstances in which they are exchanged must not 
lead the average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect to consider 
that there is a connection between the two undertakings at issue in the main proceedings or that the gas used to 
refill those bottles comes from Kosan Gas. In order to assess whether such an erroneous impression is precluded, 
it is necessary to take into account the practices in that sector and, in particular, whether consumers are accustomed 
to gas being filled by other dealers. The court stated that it is reasonable to assume that a consumer who goes 
directly to Viking Gas might be more able to be aware that there is no connection between Viking Gas and Kosan 
Gas. Interestingly, the court also stated that ‘as regards the fact that the composite bottles bear word and figurative 
marks made up of the name and logo of Kosan Gas which remain, according to the findings of the national court, 
visible in spite of the labelling affixed by Viking Gas to those bottles, it must be pointed out that this constitutes 
a relevant factor in so far as it seems to rule out that labelling from altering the condition of the bottles by masking 
their origin.’ 
 
45 See fn. 42 from the perspective of Art 10 2 a. In the context of exhaustion, the previous case law on repacking 
pharmaceuticals has been based on the ‘special rights constituting specific subject matter of trademark’ test. In 
its case law, the court has developed rules on which forms of repacking and using a trademark can negatively 
impact either on how consumers perceive the origin referred to by the trademark, or on the trademark’s 
reputation, and therefore can constitute a legitimate reason for a trademark owner to object the use of the 
trademark. See, eg, cases Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer 
Erzeugnisse mbH., C-102/77, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S, C-427/93 and C H Boehringer Sohn, 
Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Boehringer Ingelheim A/S v. Paranova A/S, C-429/93 and Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft and  Bayer Danmark A/S v. Paranova A/S, C-436/93, Boehringer Ingelheim KG, et al v. 
Swingward Ltd, C-143/00, Boehringer Ingelheim KG et al .v. Swingward Ltd et al. C-348/04. 
46 According to this limitation, it is permitted to use signs or indications which are not distinctive or which concern 
the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of 
rendering the service, or other characteristics of goods or services; on condition that the use by a third party is in 
accordance with honest practises in industrial or commercial matters. 
 
   
 
   
 
marketed. More specifically, the CJEU explicitly stated in Adidas that exploitation of a 
trademark in a purely decorative purpose does not amount to such use.47 These strict 
interpretations do not give much room for trademark usage in connection of recycling. Division 
between usage of a) a trademark as a characteristic itself of a good offered by the recycling 
industry or b) a trademark as an indication of the characteristics of a product offered by the 
recycling industry is not easy or even feasible.48   
Upcycling cases belong to a grey area. On one hand, trademarks serve as decorations that are 
very attractive for consumers. On the other hand, a trademark indicates the origin of raw-
material and therefore, it might genuinely be perceived as an indication of recycling. In that 
case, use of the trademark could refer to recycling as a characteristic of a good. There is no 
certainty on how the CJEU would interpret these contradictory roles of trademark. The 
assessment is further complicated by the ‘honest practices’ requirement. 
The ultimate problem lies in the way the limitations are formulated: the purpose of use covered 
by limitations is defined narrowly and the content of limitations fails to meet the interests of 
the circular economy. Innovative ways to utilize recycled products, such as manufacturing 
products by utilizing raw materials from completely different product categories, should be 
encouraged in this respect. For an environmentally-conscious consumer, an original trademark 
left affixed to such a product might serve as an important indication of the origin of its raw 
material. However, trademark law fails to recognise such interest. An additional difficulty 
might be unpredictability due to the very limited amount of case law in the recycling context 
in Europe.  
3. Possible remedies 
A general-level problem is fundamental: the basic structures of intellectual property rights do 
not offer enough support for sustainability. Since sustainability arguments are often intertwined 
with competition arguments, and since the fundamental aim of IPRs is to contribute to the 
welfare of society, there should not exist enormous difficulties in promoting sustainability by 
regulation of intellectual property rights. A strong property-right approach, however, hinders 
sustainability arguments, and a balance between sustainability and the interests of right owners 
requires sustainability to be embedded more explicitly into IPR regulation. In the IPR context, 
sustainability should serve as a general principle with limiting effects on IPRs, directing the 
incentives set by IPRs in a way that fosters sustainability and sustainable competition. 
As such, the fact that the repair business must resort to exceptions and limitations is a structural 
problem that leads to sustainability being easily overridden by right holders’ interests.  The 
awareness of a need for comprehensive changes in consumption models should be reflected in 
weighing between sustainability and protection of property rights. In this assessment, 
sustainability cannot be seen as less valuable in society than protection of property rights. From 
that perspective, the best alternative would be to embed sustainability and the right to repair 
perspective directly in the provisions conferring exclusive rights as such. Exclusive rights 
should be formulated so that they are limited within the sustainable lifespan idea. This would 
mean that the scope of infringing acts should be re-defined in a way that only acts beyond the 
genuine purpose of maximising the lifespan of a product or material would be infringing acts. 
                                                          
47 See Adam Opel v. Autec AG, C-48/05; Adidas AG et al v. Marca Mode CV, C-102/07.  
48 For instance Kur criticizes the division between using a trademark as an element of a good or an element that 
indicates something on the good. A Kur, ‘Small Cars, Big Problems?  – An analysis of the ECJ´s Opel./.Autec 
Decision and its consequences’, in A Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, U Bernitz, B Domeij, A Kur, PJ Nordell (eds): 
Festskrift till Marianne Levin. Norsteds Juridik, Stockholm 2008, 329–352, at 343. 
   
 
   
 
In that case, property rights would be seen in a realistic way in relationship with planetary 
boundaries as enforced in the limits set by sustainability.  
A second general problem is legal uncertainty as such as a remarkable risk for repair activities. 
In many areas of the repair business, there is no great profit expectation.49 Therefore, risks of 
court proceedings are too great in relation to profit expectations. This in turn reduces incentives 
for the repairing business. The UPC will offer only limited harmonisation in many respects, 
and international harmonisation is needed for dismantling these barriers. 
A first-aid solution, beyond correcting structural bias, might be to update Kohler’s ideas to the 
era of the modern circular economy. In fact, it seems that Kohler’s ideas as such are not 
problematic, but rather the way the ‘normal lifespan’ of a product is perceived in society. The 
problem is exacerbated by the civil law tradition of the courts’ strong respect for the will of the 
legislator and a sceptical attitude towards court-made rules.50 Therefore, the courts have a 
tendency to dogmatic and traditional viewpoints instead of opening their argumentation for 
issues beyond the traditional doctrinal basis.  
The way that the public perceive a product’s lifespan is crucial in assessing repairs in the patent 
context. General attitudes towards ‘take, make, waste’ consumption models as well as 
consumption models adopted by the circular economy all impact on this. However, patent 
holders’ business models and marketing acts might have a fundamental impact. In case they 
have incentives to apply linear, short-term consumption models, consumers might see the 
lifespan of the product as short. Therefore, general attitudes in society towards sustainability 
are crucial.  
One option would be to embed the incentive for the circular economy into the repair and 
reconstruction dichotomy by reassessing the ‘normal lifespan of the product’ idea.  Instead of 
the ‘normal lifespan’, which is often perceived as following the ‘take, make and waste’ 
consumption models instead of including an obligation for sustainable lifespan, we could 
apply, for instance, a threshold of a ‘normal, sustainable lifespan for that particular category of 
product’, or an ‘environmentally-friendly lifespan’.  
This would mean a transformation from the idea of what the lifespan of a product to an idea of 
what it should be, that is, how long the product should work in a sustainable-based society. 
That would include, for instance, assessing the feasibility of selling changeable parts for such 
products. What kind of consequences would there be if such an approach were adopted? It 
would create incentives for the circular economy and sustainable products, but a drawback 
might be more uncertainty. To avoid this, more detailed guidelines for assessing sustainable 
lifespan should be adopted. However, the difficulty is that there must be a certain level of 
flexibility in thresholds relating to repair and reconstruction. Similarly to, for instance, the 
threshold of originality or innovative step, assessment must be dependent on circumstances and 
technology, for example.  Therefore, a certain level of unpredictability is present since it is not 
possible to create detailed guidelines. 
Harmonisation efforts should be taken under the idea of sustainable lifespan. Since 
international harmonisation might not be a realistic option as being arduous to achieve, a faster 
and more flexible mechanism could be to set the guidelines of sustainable lifespan by soft law 
mechanisms. For instance, guidelines could be set by WIPO recommendations.  
                                                          
49 Liu (n 1) 2014, 332. 
50 See more, eg, J Husa, K Nuotio and H Pihlajamäki, ‘Nordic Law – Between Tradition and Dynamism’, In 
(eds) J Husa, K Nuotio and H Pihlajamäki, Nordic Law – Between Tradition and Dynamism, Intersentia 2007, 1, 
9. 
   
 
   
 
 
A tendency to consider non-typical uses of a trademark where a trademark is perceived as 
something else as a badge or origin, as prima facie trademark infringements, reflects a strong 
property right perspective. A vice-versa assumption should be applied: in cases where the 
ultimate focus of trademark use is not on the badge of origin type of purpose and the use is 
considered feasible from the sustainable business model point of view, should be out of the 
scope of trademark rights. Flexibilities under the rules conferring rights (Article 10.2 a-c) 
should be used not only to adapt trademark rights to new use environments but also to foster 
innovative ways to recycle. After that, sustainable business would more easily avoid the traps 
of narrow interpretations offered by trademark exceptions and limitations. In principle, it would 
be relatively easy for the CJEU to revisit the interpretations of Article 10.2 a-c and genuinely 




Genuine integration of sustainability into the IPR system would require a fundamental change 
in how the relationship is perceived between IPRs as property rights and interests relating, for 
instance, to the circular economy. As long as a possibility to radically extend the lifespan of 
patented products and their materials is perceived as an exception to a strong property right, 
sustainability does not serve as a strong argument. The same concerns creating attractive and 
innovative recycled products for consumers by utilising a raw-material’s trademark as an 
indication of recycling, which might contribute to improving attitudes towards recycling. 
A first aid type of solution to the two individual problems described in this Chapter would be 
to integrate the sustainable lifespan threshold into the exceptions and limitations, such as into 
the exhaustion doctrine. However, structural bias should primarily be corrected by formulating 
exclusive rights so that sustainable lifespan defines the scope of exclusive rights themselves. 
IPRs should cover only acts beyond those whose genuine purpose is to maximise the lifespan 
of a product or material. This might restrain perceiving sustainability only as an exception and 
would apply to all situations where IPRs and circular economy interests collide in the context 
of IPR infringements.  
